Lila_Talk_\#41
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Recording 41
Y: Now you had something.
B: First if you want to see new logo
Y: Yes.
B: It was finished by Karuna, (full of?) matrices and
Y: Darshana, you will want to see this.
B: Sanskrit, and it is beauty, pure beauty. Hey, I was so happy to see it! Oh, want to see, but is beautiful. And she said she will work on the colours. She wants to make them brighter, these red colours, but actually it is beautiful.

Y: Yes, it's this should be brighter; and this should be clearer.
B: (Acknowledges) She said...she will work on this Li and La...
Darshana: Extra line there the...
B: Ah, yes, this is like this one. It was taken from Devanagari Unicode symbols.
Don: (Acknowledges)
B: From open document writer. Yeah, yes, there was not there. She has done different designed for this. Yes, but otherwise, it is so beautiful.

Y: Ok, very good.
Don: Yes.
B: That's it.
Y: We are on our way.
Don: Yes.
Y: Who knows what will happen.
Don: That's for sure.

Y: As they say, the rule is that at first they ignore you. And when they can't ignore you anymore, they laugh at you. And when they can't laugh anymore, they give up and join you.

Darshana: I think you are skipping the one where...
Y: One step.
Darshana: Where they try to kill you.
Don: Yeah, I was wondering about that. Try to destroy you.
Darshana: The third one.
B: This is past already; this stage has past.
Y: They missed their chance.
B: Now they are joining; now we are at the stage.
Darshana: Like that
B: Yes, I know. Yes. Great!
Darshana: You could wrap...
B: She will do it. Maybe she'll will...
Darshana: She picked maybe the wrong one. The...
B: Because they have a hole...
Darshana: Aha! Because it adds on.
B: Not just the letter, but whole part of..
Darshana: Anyway, l'll put it back.
Y: Yes.
B: It could be done. She will do it dot by dot.
Darshana: I'll show her.
\{Formal session\}
Y: Ok, what you got?
B: Shall I show you this?

## Y: (Acknowledges)

$\mathrm{B}: \mathrm{Ah}$, this is regarding our yesterday discussion on determined integral as a means to find the size of the universe. I now, I have done here three simple examples. In order to make it clear, and in order of us to agree that this is the way to proceed, it could be done although the curve is not defined explicitly. Still there are means to fine the integral, to integrate the curve. And so we actually...in this way, we integrate both space and time, so to say, and have the size of the universe roughly. Of course, there is (fill turi?), dark matter. Maybe states of no knowledge, are dark matter? And so on. If we agree that this is the way to proceed, then I have done these simple examples. For instance, a determined integral is for...its geometrical explanation, is a surface under the curve which is investigated. For instance, if $F$ of $X$ is the curve or the function, then the portion, the surface under a determined portion of this curve, is determined integral. So the $P$ is integral $A$ to $B, F$ of $X$ the $X$.
3:52
Y: Yes.
B: Now, I have done three simple examples in order to show this. For instance, if we have a constant as a curve, it is a straight line; then integral is K D X from Zero to C. It is KX in the limits from zero to C . It is K . First we replace the upper limit, C minus the lower limit zero; it is KC. And really KC is the surface of this.

Y: Yes, that is standard calculus.
5:36
B: Yes, yes, standard calculus. So two other examples, for instance, if we have a line $Y$ is $X, F$ of $X$ is $X$, then the surface from the limits zero to $D$ will be determined integral from zero to $D, X(D ?) X$. And solution of this integral is $X^{2}$ over 2 in the limits from Zero to D . And this is one half of this squared. We first replace the upper limit minus the lower limit which is zero, is D square 2. In really, this is half of this rectangular; and this is...the surface of the triangle is D square 2. This and this are equal due to the fact curve is Y is X . I have picked up very simple examples.

## Y: (Acknowledges)

B: And finally taking all this into account, a Simpson's rule has been introduced in order to do this cases when either the integration is not straight forward, for instance, as when we have arc tangents, arc cosines, so on and so on; or in cases which is actually our case when the curve is not determined explicitly. We don't have the curve. And it is very, very often the case in science and in engineering.

## Y: (Acknowledges)

7:40
B: We don't have the curve; otherwise, all will be very easy. But we have measurements; we have interpolation of between the dots, the points obtained by measurement and so on. And so for these cases, Simpson's rule has been introduced. In this rule, we split the surface under the curve which we have...we have the curve in simple portions, in small portions. And we summarize them all. So the rule of Simpson's says [I] is sum of... when small [I] goes from one to $n$, of $F$ of $X$ [I] delta X [I]. So we have actually discrete elements. It is (quantation / quantisation?) of the curve. So this is what we shall do once we agree that we shall
simplify the line of thinking, so to speak, although this is the...this is what comes out from Lila and find the surface under the curve.

Y: Yes.
B: And this will give us... and this is in accordance with Wheeler's rule who says, "Count the charges." And we count the ones...the Planck length.

Y: Music.
B: (?)
Y: Music.
B: Ah! Music, yes. Now I wanted to show in order to make it easier for us to work with the logarithmic scale and to adjust it. It is to see how to do it in a way... it is, of course...

Y: I think that will be quite useful.
B: Yes.
Y: So.
B: So, for instance, we have logarithmic scale here. Typical length on logarithmic scale are the values when we have ten times a certain value.

Y: (Acknowledges)
B: Ten times, and it is already denoted a name for this distance if it is length; and it is one decade.

Y: (Acknowledges)
9:20
B: We have it in electrical engineering when we have boat diagrams. Boats like this, boat. There are diagrams which are used for design of linear circuits, of linear compensation...compensation of linear systems. When the system is not stable, for instance, in industry or whenever you have a system, it is stable. The solution is not stable; and very often you couldn't solve it, you couldn't use it. When it is not stable, there are oscillations, vibrations and so on.

Y: (Acknowledges)
B: And so in order to do it stable some...very often a compensation circuits are built into the system in order to compensate for the error.

Y: Yes.
10:12
B: And...in order to do this, this boat's diagrams are being used. And so this terminology is taken from these charts, boat's charts; and also in music. For
instance, when we have...if this is, for instance, frequency. Here I have...if this is frequency, then when you have twice bigger frequency from a given one, then this distance is called an octave, octave like in music. So, for instance, from $C$ to upper $C$ when the opera singer sings, and glass are crashed in some.

Y: Yes, one octave.
B : This is one octave. So, one octave is twice this distance.
Y: Yes.
B: And this helps us a lot since we know that logarithm of two is 0.30103 . So it is somewhere at the one-third of the decade of the distance from one to ten.

Y: (Acknowledges)
$B$ : This is 0.30 so on. Now second rule, since logarithm of A squared is 2 logarithm of $A$, this is due to the features of the logarithmic function, then actually twice as much is four...

## Y: (Acknowledges)

B: ...which is 0.6 ; and since logarithm of 2 to third degree is logarithm of 8 is 3 times logarithm of 2 , so 8 will be three times this distance. So we have 2 on the one third. Then double this distance. It's four; then double this distance is 8 . And the others are according this one, approximately in logarithmic scale. So 9 will be approximately here. Five which is of interest to us in the light of what we want to do... Now to find the approximation of the integral curve, five is of interest because this is the way I purpose to develop methodology. So five is of interest, five is somewhere 0.7.

## Y: (Acknowledges)

B: All this. And now, in order to have a broader view here, we have three decades, Four decades presented: 1-10, $10-100,100-1000,1000-10,000$. And on each and every scale, we have approximately at $1 / 3$, we have 2 . Doubled we have 4 ; doubled three times we have 8. And five is here at 0.7 . And then the same is for the all because it is logarithmic scale. So, 10-20 is just the same as $1-2 \ldots$ just the same as $100-200$, just the same as 1000-2000, 10,000-20,000, and so on and so on. So here this logarithmic scale is being presented in order for...to alleviate our thinking, to make it easier. And finally, we have algorithm A-B is algorithm A plus logarithm B which should also be taken into account when doing the diagram. We shall have, maybe, different parts of the surface under the curve. And now I have drawn here a diagram which part of our curve, the original pattern $X$ boson first crossover...

Y: Yes.
B: And I have written here the coordinates for this points. For instance, we could do an estimation and use Mathematica for it of the portion of the curve beginning from $X$ boson to W boson to this Weinberg-Salam phrase. And the coordinates are for the X
boson for the time we have Q over n plus 1TQ. And for the length, $\mathrm{N} 4^{\text {th }}$ square of 24 of $N$ to the third over third square over 6 N squared length quanta where $T Q$ is Planck length over square of 2 N and so on. So what I propose although we couldn't actually...it will be proportional (?) the universe. It will not begin from the beginning. 15:33
Y: Yes.
B: If we have another point here, maybe it will be better in order to make comparison with what is know in cosmology. We could find ready...we could find something which is measured and compare.

Y: Well, if they could start with one length quanta.
B: Yes, yes, but we, (Acknowledges) and even...now let me finish. And I'll tell you another way. We can simply draw roughly a portion of the curve which is known. And then simply put it on a paper and cut it with scissors and measure. Even this could be done roughly in order to have estimation. We could cut it with scissors. And here at 0.7 where it's half, I could find the middle line and then use it in order to do the estimation. And finally, I have done this portion of the curve and how to do estimation although, of course, it is better to start at the beginning. Here we have portion of the curve from X boson to W boson. The coordinates on the horizontal axis are...the starting is N arc cotangents (?) Q over N plus one.
17:00
Y: (Acknowledges)
$B$ : And the ending one is N arch cosine of one over 2 to Q squared over 2 N squared. So this is the portion of the time multiplied by TQ. This is on the horizontal axis. And the vertical axis for X boson for the first point, we have this 4 squared 24 N $1 / 3$ over $1 / 3$ square 6 N square. And for the final...

Y: LQ.
B: LQ, yes, you are right. Here I have LQ; here I have LQ, TQ, TQ. And this one for the boson is N squared of 2 N LQ. So I have written here, it is...we could do as Archimedes has done for the...

Y: That may or may not be correct.
B: Ok.
Y: Question mark.
B: Question mark. And now the method is...we find the middle line which on the linear scale if this is linearised. Then this is the middle. The middle line will be some where at 0.7 due to this considerations previously.

Y: (Acknowledges)
B: And we measure. We could simply measure it. If we don't know the value for this point, then it could be measured. It would be estimated and then when... If I multiply
this middle measured line by the distance in time or the segment of the horizontal axis, then l'll get this surface which is rectangular supposing that this remaining surface and this remaining surface are the same. So what we shall obtain is actually the surface under this portion of the curve which is in accordance with Simpson's rule although this will use just the size of the portion of the universe.

Y: Yes.
$B$ : And then I have found this M which is this difference here.
Y: That's the middle.
B: It's the middle, yes. The middle is this one which is, if it is correct, N square of 2 N L quanta minus the smaller one which is 4 square of $24 \mathrm{~N} 1 / 3$ square over $1 / 3$ square of 6 N squared L quanta over 2. Or even it could be measured. But this is the estimation providing this section of the vertical axis is taken at the value of 0.7 of this portion here or half on the linear scale. And then it is straight forward. Then we find the surface under this portion of the curve. So actually, we shall actually find this one which approximately the same as this one which is of interest because this portion here and this portion here, we take them approximately to be the same.

Y: Approximately, yes.
B: Yes, approximately. So if I take this...these are arrows, arrows, arrows, arrows. And the number of arrows in this portion are the number of arrows in this portion here. So this is approximation. This is due to Simpson's rule. Or even to be better, we could... actually this is what we are doing; we are finding the surface of this polygon here, trapez...

Don: Trapezoid.
B: And finally the surface is this middle line which is found in this way by approximation multiplied by the portion of time. And the portion of time is N arc cosine 1 over 2 Q squared over 2 N squared minus N arc cotangent Q over N plus 1 TQ. It could be all done by Mathematica. We could be patient and do it, maybe not during the sessions. We could do it, but it is...

Y: But I understand...
B: Better to do it at the beginning of the curve.
Y: I understand your approach.
B: And this portions could be...we could do portion by portion, portion by portion, maybe a month for a portion, another month for another portion.

Y: I will first lay out what is known...
B: Yes, yes, yes.

Y : And like this is not known, this is an estimation.
B: Yes. Ok. We should have as many points as possible.
Y: But I know what the grand unification theory says it should be. This..
B: Yes, yes.
$Y$ : This size of the universe at that time.
B: Yes.
Y: But they give it. Yes, they have. We have that. They are assuming a threedimensional space at this point. And...

B: Ah, yes. According to you, it is two... second crossover.
Y: But I think we have the second crossover about that point.
B: Yes, the second crossover.
Y: And so it would be three-dimensional. Second crossover makes threedimensions.

B: The third crossover.
Y: No.
B: In your early articles you have the second...
Y: First crossover produces an area square, second crossover cubed, is that right?
B: In your earlier articles, as far as I understand, with Seeley and Baker you have this approach which you explain here: for the circuit one-dimensional, for the first crossover second-dimension, for the second crossover three-dimensional. But later on you corrected this view because if we take the second crossover to be twodimensional, then the first crossover is one-dimensional. If you take the second crossover to be three-dimensional, then the first crossover is two-dimensional. And then just the circuit should be one-dimensional which is not the case.

Y: Not possible. No bifurcation.
B: You have just time, not space here.
Y: Yes.
Don: What we have been plotting on this the first crossover is one-dimensional, and the second is two which is what...

Y: First crossover, yes.

Don: ...which is one-dimensional.
Y: But which boson are we talking about?
B: W.
Don: At the second crossover the W boson. The first crossover is the X boson.
Y: Yes.
Don: Third crossover is $Z$ boson. the start of unbounded 3D space.
Y : I think that is correct. So, one more we get to the Z boson.
B: Yes. Like, yes, for the $Z$ boson, yes.
Y: And that would be three-dimensions at that, from that point on. Ok. But l'll have to put together that chart I was telling you about that shows what we know.

B: Yes.
Y: About each point. What we know from the grand unification and about magnetic monopoles, what we know about the standard big bang, what we know about the Lila Paradigm. Ok, then you can do this.

B: (Acknowledges) Yes, if we agree to the approach.
Y: Yes.
B: Yes, then great. I was thinking about this. But it is not ready yet. I was thinking merging of the matrices, actually merging of the circuits. For instance, we have in a baby universe...

Y: (Acknowledges)
B: ...which is smallest circuit possible. For example, and then we have another circuit. And then all of the sudden, they were separate. But then we have state of knowledge of the one individual of the first circuit to the second. And then this...

Y: And that makes it available to the other two.
B: Yes it is, to the other two, yes. The circuit is closed. And so what we get is actually...although it is not closed in mathematical sense, there is no pathway.
$Y$ : There is no pathway back here.
B: Yes, but still it is a circuit. It should be a circuit according to Lila. It should be a circuit because now all these individuals through B D through the fact that D...

Y: So these will all be conscious of a circuit, but of this circuit.

B: Yes, and not the other way around.
Y: Yes.
B: Yes.
Y: Otherwise, you would have to have one more arrow.
B: Yes, yes, then it makes...yes, it is correct which makes actually the problem easier from mathematical point of view because we just search for a closed circuit...

Y: Yeah.
B: ... which we have actually, we have.
Y: Yes, as long as we have a search method.
B: We do have.
Y: Yes. You described it.
B: Yes, I described it in my letters. We might do it once again here.
Y: So, I think it can be done. And you do to...
B: Yes, yes.
Y: ...using the Monte Carlo method.
B: Yes, yes, although it will be rough, we know this.
Y: Yes, that's all right. We don't have super computers and a staff of 500 people.
B: In CERN, they have 2000 people working fifteen years for a project they are to...
Y: CERN goes on next month. They turn it on.
B: Ah, next month.
Y: Next month.
B: Yeah, they will put this particles to collide.
Y: I just got a report on that large hadron collider.
$B$ : Ah, yes.
Y: And they are all set. And it gives an explanation of how they are going to get the measurements, and how long it will take.

B: Yes.
Y: But they all have a... within three months, they should have pretty good idea whether they are going to find a Higgs boson or not. I predict they won't. And they will find something else instead even more exciting.

B: When I was there, they announced that two years will be needed in order to analyse all the charts.

Y: Yes, to do it carefully.
B: To do it right.
Y: First of all they eliminate $99 \%$ of all the observations because they already know those kinds. So they have a computer that filters them out. And even so, there's billions of ones to work with two thousand people and huge detectors multi-story high. It is incredible big science. Ok. And ours is little science; but it has the power. What is this?

B: I was thinking whether we could do a similar simulation which was done by Baker for the first crossover. He has done it for the $X$ boson for the first crossover, the circling over the circuit.

Y: The beat.
B: Yes, the beat, one time beat, the smaller and the bigger. And I wondered if I could do it for two.

Y: Then you would get a harmonic for the two beats.
B: Yes. And it is actually sum over history, isn't it so? Sum over history?
$Y$ : Yes, it is.
B: And so, maybe l'll do of those days, to do something similar as this picture with the harmonics. And maybe to...but then we should know the wavelength of W boson and replaced here. And we shall have here actually two unknowns, a system of two equations with two unknowns where the unknowns will be the number of the circling around the smaller circuit. It will be X . And the other will be the number of the circling of the bigger...

Y : We know the frequency of the muon and of the tau particle.
B: But maybe this is too speculative, so...
Y: You gave her the copy of the co-data, all the information.
Don: I think so, I don't know.
Y: I thought I saw one.

## 32:22

Don: There was one, I thought I scanned it in and (?)
Y: That has the Planck length on it and it several pages.
Don: Yes. I know l've seen it. I honestly can't recall if I (?)
Y: I think you gave it to her, a copy to her. And it has the Compton wavelength.
Don: I can look it up and...in case we need it.
Y: Ok, now we can do some other work. I was not happy. You got a copy of this?
B: In my bag because Darshana gave me it when I was at (Lila?)
33:39
Y: Did it work, Darshana, the monitor?
Darshana: Yeah, it worked beautifully. Fine.
Y: You just plug it in.
Darshana: Yeah.
Don: But you also have to press the function F7 key to switch.
Y: F 17?

Don: F7.
Y: 7.
Darshana: The key that says F7.
Y: So you had to know that?
Darshana: Yeah.
Don: Yeah. I had to go look at...I knew there was something. And I had to go look at the keys and see the little picture on it. The function key F7, it will probably be the two displays. I used to do that when giving presentations on overhead projectors.

Y: Yes, I am not happy about no colours on this...
B: Ah!
Y : ...because it is quite a tangle.
B: So let us do it now with the colours.

Y: No, I think I have another idea. It's quite a tangle. And I am introducing something new combining the states of consciousness with states of knowledge. And it is very complicated for space. What I would like to do is do it simpler one. And do it with just time, or even simpler just for matter. Also I am not completely happy with the wording. I'll just read one of them. This is the one that goes for this line here.

A's direct knowledge of B's state of knowledge of C compared with A's consciousness of a physical particle (dot)•.

I just call it a physical particle. And we've got a state of knowledge. And I just call it C. I don't call it C •, then compared with A's consciousness of a physical particle (dot)• because you don't know in your consciousness; you don't. What you are conscious of is just of a particle. You don't know what it is based on. But there is this line; I can't tell you it's a blue line because yours doesn't have blue line in it.

B: I will make it blue.
Y: It goes around the state of knowledge of $C$ and all the attributes of $A$. But it also goes around this. I'll wait till you get that done. Your colour printer is not working right.

Don: I don't have a colour cartridge at the moment.
Y: It's the one you can't afford.
Don: Yep.
Y: Then the red line is...goes to this square and includes...It says A's consciousness of (dot)• it is just a (dot)•, not a C • but a (dot)•. This goes down and around the existence, unity and ability to acts and then back. So that consciousness state and this state of knowledge, you have got to watch what I am doing with my fingers. This state of knowledge that A is in and this box of consciousness state, those two are in a single state which is this blue. They combine by rule two. Remember the second rule where any two states will form a new state? In this case, it is a state made up of a state of knowledge that $A$ is in and a state of consciousness that $A$ is in. And we get A's direct knowledge of B's state of knowledge of C compared with that is brought into the same state with A's consciousness of a physical particle. So not only is A conscious of a physical particle, but it is also in a state of knowledge with regard to that particle. But it is not conscious that it is of $C$; it is just is in a state of knowledge that that particle is associated with C or based on C . And that is what I am trying to show is that one has that knowledge although one is not conscious of that knowledge. And if you do that for $D$, and then we have the one that goes around both of those double states that is the state of knowledge here of D and the consciousness that is based on D which is just of a (dot)• combined with the same thing for C which is this yellow dotted overall states. And it says A is consciousness dash knowledge of $\mathrm{C} \bullet$ and $\mathrm{D} \bullet$ being compared in present time. Also not on here is how they get into present time. That would be additional circles. And I think it is going to have to be broken down in frames.
B: (Acknowledges) Yes.

Don: Yes.
Y: So that's just the beginning. But we have this overall content of A's state of consciousness dash knowledge. Now maybe dash is not the best way to do it. Maybe we should have some symbol that shows that consciousness state and knowledge state are merged or something. I don't know in symbolic logic whether they have a... would it be and would...Does that mean the same thing as merged? If you say, "And it usually this and this."

B: Yes, a union.
Y: But that's different than this and this merged into a single state. So...
B: You know...

Y: The symbolic logic there ought to be one. This is the area that merged.
B: Yes, this is and this is and or intersection.
Y: Do they have a symbol for that?
$B$ : And yes. The symbol is, for instance, if this set $A$ and this is set $B$, then this area is A intersected by B :

Y: Intersected.
B: Intersected. And we have...when you have this one, then this and this... or this. This is or. And the symbol for this, if this is C and this is D is C union with D . Why it is so? Because when we are observing the elements of the set for this intersection, we say $X$ belongs to $A$; and $X$ belongs to $B$ : These elements belong both to this set and this set which is actually the case here. These elements belong both to this one and this one. And this is intersection or and. And this here or here. Then this is a union. This symbol.

Y: That's what we need.
B: Yes. Yes, yes.
Y: I can see it upside down and I can read upside down. I'll tell you why I learned to read upside down.

B: Really.
Y: Yes, every Sunday would come the newspaper, Sunday paper...
B: (Acknowledges)
Y: ...to our house. And my brothers, my older brothers, would take the comic strips apart and sit down on the living room rug and start reading it. And I would sit like this
and follow along upside down. So I learned to read upside down. So now when I try to read ordinary, I have to go through an extra step. My brain is...

B: This is tremendous.
Y: Is dyslectic because of that.
B: This is like Leonard De Vinci who was as in a mirror...
Y: Mirror.
B: Mirror image.
Y: It is like that only this case it is upside down. But it gave me one ability. I can write my name upside down. And not only that, I can write my last name upside down from the beginning to the end, and my first name upside down from the end to the beginning both hands at the same time.

Darshana: Backwards.
Y: Yes.
45:32
B: Yeah, that something. This is really (?)
Y: People say, "No, you can't!" And then I do it. Then they say, "Well, you can!"
B: Fantastic.
Y: Anyway, I don't get lost in these tangles; but other people do. And I am not sure the words describe it. But you see what I am trying to do.

B: Yes, yes.
Y: But I think we need your help.
B: Yes.
Y: With your knowledge of symbolic logic and...
B: Ok, you know, just last night I was thinking, we should introduce now something new in order to combine consciousness and knowledge based on what you have been talking last session.

Y: It is this sort of thing.
B: So the...this sort of thing, yes, yes. But it should be combined. Now we should introduce a matrix or not matrix or just a set in the manner it is done in the Venn diagrams. These are call Venn diagrams. Venn, with the attributes. It will be a set. It will also be a set even a matrix. A set with the ...we should do it. And then this
should be, as you said, it should be separated. And we should do exactly which is which. For instance, this is consciousness of the particle.

Y: I have used squares for consciousness, circles for states of knowledge.
B: Yes. Aha! Yes. Yes, this approach.
Y: And then secondary...secondaries I just used bags or...
47:44
B: Aha! (elipsators?) or something.
Y: So that needs work. But this idea is there.
B: Yes, and even use the colours.
Y: Yes. Online you can use colours now that that don't have coloured screens everywhere. You can use colours on computers.

B: Yes. So we...
Y: Darshana, would you bring my coat? I am having one of those chill attacks.
Darshana: Lean forward.
Y: So if you would work on that, maybe you can do some separation like you did for time.

Don: Yes.
Y: Something along that line.
Don: I was thinking, just visually, we have square for and circles. I was just thinking a polygon for that shared state.

Y: For the mixed state?
Don: Ah, just...it was obvious that it was...
Y: I see visually it would be combined.
Don: I don't know if it will work but...
Y: You keep this for now then.
Don: I have a colour scanner for this. I can use. So I can...I'll work from that. Yes, I really...l think this is very useful.

Y: And you can work on...
B: On the symbolic.

Y: On the logic and...
B: Yes. It will be something like...this is the knowledge; and this is consciousness...
Y: And he suggested that combination of the two could be a polygon.
B: Yes I understood. Yes, it might be.
Don: Who knows? l'll try; see if it works.
B: Also different levels if this is again three-dimensional, this and then the next level rectangular.

Y: So you can do that at your leisure. And we will go on now...
B: (Acknowledges) Yes, of course.
Y: ...with the text on page 8, on consciousness. Without Bret here, it is much easier because I am not trying to get him to understand what I would like to see him understand. So, half our work is done. This is page 8 on consciousness in the bold type.

Consciousness is a state a non-physical individual is in wherein an attribute in state of direct knowledge a non-physical individual is in is the same as or is like an (ontological) attribute of the non-physical individual who is in that state of direct knowledge.

And I am thinking about inserting the word before... Right after
The same as or is like an ontological attribute.
B: (Acknowledges)
Y: And I think that should be in there.
Of the non-physical individual who is in that state of direct knowledge.
And I think at that point, it should be inserted the drawing of the self drawing. It is around here some place. Here it is. That, that's where this should go.

B: (Acknowledges)
Y: And then I think this definition of consciousness should be restated in other words. Just state the same thing of what consciousness is but just reword it. And I can do that. The reason I have used the same as in the first definition here...

Is the same as an attribute... Is the same as an ontological attribute
...is because in the case of self, it is the same. But it is tricky because does it mean the same or is it just like?

B: (Acknowledges)
Y : Because it's not one in the same.
B: Not one in the same.
Y: There are two different attributes. There is the ontological attributes; and a state of direct knowledge based on A's ontological attributes. That becomes clear in the drawing. But in the definition, I just wonder. Maybe we should use like or it's equivalent or something.

Don: Yes, equivalent is..
B: Yes, yes. Ah, equivalent maybe.
Don: Yeah, sounds good.
Y: Sounds good.
B: Identical or equivalent? Not identical.
Y: Well, identical sometimes means...
B: The same.
Y: The same. In fact in the dictionary, it gives both meanings for the word identical.
B: Yes, it's not good.
Y: And I...Michael Baker liked identical; but I like same. But I think probably...
B: Equivalent.
Y: Like, maybe better.
B: Like is better. And you...
Y: And that's the one the philosophers use. When you have a pair of identical twins, they are not identical; they are like each other. They are the same; but they are different.

B: There is another Einstein, Podolshy, Rosen experiment. And it's good when you don't have parenthesis in an essential definition.

Y: Say that again.
B: I say,
Y : It is good.

B: It is better when in your essential definition, which is this one, you shouldn't have parenthesis. Later on you could explain.

Y: Because it breaks their thought.
B: Yes, breaks the thought. It is good to explain later on. But in the basic, it should be avoided.

Y: I agree.
Don: Ah, good point. So we are just leaving it 'like.'
B: Is like.
Y: Is like. But insert ontological in front of attributes of the non-physical individual. Now this is a funny state of affairs because they are both states of $A$. That is, who $A$ is, for example, the ontological state of who $A$ is, is one state. And who $A$ is in the state of knowledge based on A, come together in...or in...we want in the new state that is formed. See I drew a...

B: Yes, I see.
Y: A polygon around it.
B: A polygon?
Y: Or could it be square?
B: It is direct knowledge, knowledge...
Y: Well, because it would be defining what consciousness is.
B: Yes.
Don: If it is consciousness, it's a square.
Y: Yes, but that's different than two states of knowledge being in a single state that might be...or if it is mixed with a state of knowledge. But in this case, it's a state of knowledge mixed with an ontological state. And that's a new kind of combination that we haven't discussed before. And it's the most fundamental of all.

B: Yes.
Y: So what to do about that? Well, what I have drawn is a line going from one to the other. Is that good enough, this line here? Is (does) that show a state? I don't think it is adequate.

B: Yes. It should be stronger.
Y: Yes.

B: It is stronger because it leads to another higher category which is consciousness.
Y: That's right.
B: It should be stronger. Either both or...
Y: I think not. Put the line in between and put...
B: Yes, yes, yes, you are right! Not a line but put...
Y: Now a line; but put something around the two.
B: Something around the two. Yes, because... and this is great that you introduce this. You know, it was a jump which was not justified, so to speak, a jump from direct knowledge to consciousness. You make a jump somehow. You know when I was writing...when I was have correspondence with a philosopher from Belgrade, he said, "There is no justification to jump from the objective to subjective, so to speak." It is too long now to...maybe it is not appropriate now to introduce this discussion.

Y: Well, I think that's...this is the crucial point. This is where the power of the Lila Paradigm lies, right there.

B: Yes, yes, it is great that you introduce consciousness in this level; and it is justified because it was a jump. I don't...I couldn't find the right words. It was a jump which was unjustified, so to speak, from direct knowledge to consciousness, like they were separated somehow. We always used to speak about basic level; then a level of consciousness. But what is the jump then? Because the jump is just as other...for instance, as you mentioned David Chalmers and Benoit Due Daniel (?); they jump. 1:12:26
Y: No Nagel, Thomas Nagel, They define consciousness that a being is conscious if there is something that it is like to be that being. Or as Chalmers says, "A mental state is a conscious state if there is something it is like to be in that mental state.

B: Chaos (?) is stronger and should be emphasized. It should.
1:02:52
Y: What?

B: Your paradigm being stronger than theirs; this should be emphasized at the very beginning.

Y: Yes.
B: And you do it. And it is great! Now...
Y: But how should we show it here? Should we put a square around each one of them? We did have that at one time; but I don't think that the line is necessary. Or should we just put...?

B: Because later on somewhere in this line of thinking, enlightenment should be introduced as different than being in state of knowledge of yourself through the others.

Y: Well, you knew a philosopher in Belgrade?
1:03:48
B: Yes, he is great! He is wonderful! He is also a good mathematician, Alexander Petrovich (?). I meet him on a conference on harmony.

Y: But I don't see the problem because we are dealing with states of knowledge.
B: Maybe there is not problem. Now I was thinking loudly (out loud).
Y: There is a state of knowledge which could be thought of as a subjective state. It's really not a subjective state. But it contains the information, the state of knowledge and that is simply assumed. So it is not a jump. It is assumed that one has that ability to be in states of knowledge of a non-physical individual.

B: Yes, yes, being this non-physical individual, it makes it all right, you know. We don't jump from physical to non-physical.

Y: No.
B: As they, the others do. So it is Ok because you state first these individuals are non-physical.

Y: A non-physical state of knowledge; and then they...
B: Yes, yes, yes.
Y: And the consciousness of a physical.
B: Yes.
Y : But in the case of self, it is not even a physical that is conscious of a non-physical self.

B: Of a non-physical self, yes.
Y: So that is why I take it first.
Don: Yogeshwar, would it help to visually distinguish between the ontological attributes themselves and the knowledge of the ontological attributes? Like one in bold and the other not because right now, they are visually equivalent.

B: Ah! Yes.
Don: Where one is an ontological attribute; and the other is a knowledge...
1:05:48
B: Yes, the ontological should (be?) both. The ontological...

Y: That is a good idea. Make them bold and put a square box around each one of them.

Don: I can put them white against black. So it is very...
Y: Or do we want to use any colour?
Don: I...
B: When we copy...
Don: It's a problem. It would be helpful. The problem is when people copy, then...
Y : When they print it off, off the web.
1:06:19
Don: Or just run copies on peoples (?).
Y: You see, it says here at the bottom, "Each of these lines represents a state of the likeness of an attribute in A's state of knowledge based on A with an ontological attribute of itself." So instead of saying lines, we would say boxes or something like that.

Don: Yeah. I was thinking of using something like that to distinguish.
Y: A polygon out of it.
Don: Sort of, just to distinguish...
Y: Because it is a mixed.
Don: Yeah.
Y: Ontological state with a state of knowledge.
Don: Yes.
Y: Good that's a good idea! He is a good artist.
B: Ah, yes, I have seen...
Y: He has a wonderful visual sense.
B: I have seen his pictures.
Y: So that drawing needs to be tied into the text and more thoroughly. Ok. Now we'll go on.

If a non-physical individual, call it Individual A, places itself in a state of direct knowledge of itself, Individual A will be consciousness of itself as it is: a nonphysical individual, a unitary existence who acts. The reason according to the above
definition of consciousness is that all four attributes of Individual A in the state of direct knowledge Individual A is in of itself are the same or alike (should say like) are like all four attribute of Individual A.

Individual A is conscious of Individual A's four attributes which is what Individual A is. This is shown in the following table.

Well, I think that whole paragraph can be written a little better. But it...I think the table is useful. How come you have a pink table and don't have a blank table? You got a special printer?

Don: Very special.
Y: Now in the table, we have a list of attributes. We have ability to act, rather than acts. But when it's combined in the state of consciousness that $A$ is in, I have written:
a unitary state that acts or unitary existence who acts.
And I think that's fine. And it's all right to call the attributes themselves ability to act. You think the table is helpful?

B: Well, yes, of course.
Y. One might ask, "Well, why is this consciousness?" Appling Thomas Nagel's famous phrase...

And I want to cite, give a situation on that.
"That a being is conscious that there is something that it is like to be that being."
And applying the statement by Chalmers:
Similarly he says, "A mental state is conscious that there is something it is like to be in that mental state."

So it seems to me that Chalmers' statement is quite clear if there is something that it is like to be in that mental state.

The mental state is Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself. Individual A itself is the something that it is like to be in that mental state.

That's the punch line.
Don: (Acknowledges)
Y: $\quad$ Since Individual A is something like Individual A in the state of direct knowledge of Individual A in which Individual A is, therefore individual A is in a state of consciousness of itself.

Now somebody said that was an infinite regression? Or extension? I don't think so.
Since Individual A is
I think it should say, the something like or is something like Individual A in the state of direct knowledge of Individual A.

And it is that state in which Individual A is. There for Individual A is in a state of consciousness of itself.

I think the logic is complete and not infinite there, but finite. And I would...I would like your comment on that. What you think.

B: And so once again:
A mental state of consciousness...A mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that mental state.

So, we have something to be in that mental state and the mental state itself. And if these two are alike...

Y: It's of itself. Say it again.
B: Yes. I am trying to put into pieces this...
Y: Yes. I just didn't hear every word.
B: Aha! Chalmers says:
A mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that mental state.
Y: Right.
B: And the mental state itself.

Y : There is something it is like to be in that mental state.
B: If there is something it is like...
Y: So what I am saying, the first statement is, the mental state is Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself.

B: Yes, so the mental state...so first we state the mental state is Individual A's state of direct knowledge. This is assumption, not assumption but axiom, for instance, so to say, the first premise, the mental state, A's state of direct knowledge of itself. And so we have a mental state. And now we are to decide whether this mental state is conscious or not. It is our aim to find if this mental state is conscious. In order this mental state to be conscious, we should have something it is like to be in that mental state.

Y: Yes.
B: So, the second is, the second premise should be to find something that it is like to be in that mental state. And now you say, "Individual A itself is the something it is like to be in that mental state." So it is fully justifiable and fully the way it should be because this is the second stage... is to find to find something that it is like to be. What is this something, this is individual A itself? Individual A itself is the something it is like to be in that mental state.

Y: And I think that statement should end right there.
B: Right there, yes. It should end right there because it is second premise.
Y: And start a new statement.
B: Yes, it is the second premise. And now, the new will be something like an additional explanation for the second premise. So it is in the same lines, in the same paragraph, is additional explanation in order to be clear. And then:
since Individual A is something like Individual A in the state of direct knowledge of Individual A in which Individual A is...

Aha! Now we are explaining why Individual A itself is the something we are looking for because we are missing now something which will be like the mental state. And then this will create consciousness. We're after something and we propose:

Individual A itself is the something it is like to be in that mental state.
And now we are explaining this second statement. And we say why it is so.
Individual A itself is something it is like to be. Since this is so because Individual A is something like Individual A in the state of direct knowledge of Individual A.

And since Individual A is something like...
This should be somehow separated. It is a whole...this which is proceeding:
Individual A in state of direct knowledge of individual A...
This is a whole statement.
In which individual A is in state of...
Aha! This is all together.
Individual A in state of direct knowledge of Individual A in which individual is.
Yes, yes. It is clear; but still some how should be separated. So first we have period after

Individual A itself is something it is like to be in that mental state.

For which we are searching, in order to fulfil the definition of Chalmers. So we have period here. And now, additional clarification. Why is it so? It is so because

Individual A is something like

## Like what? Like and now either bold or dash

Individual A in direct state of knowledge of Individual A in which Individual A is.
Now, this which is our object of comparison is the second part of the sentence.
Individual A in the state of direct knowledge of individual A.
I don't know about this addition,
in which individual A is.
This makes it...this...
Y: In which individual? That's the question. Well...
B: This makes the recursion, you know.
Y : Is it unnecessary?
1:18:26
B: Let us throw it away and decide. So, for now, I suppose, we don't have it. And see if it is sufficient. I suppose for now as a working supposition (?). We don't have
in which Individual A is.
And now, let us see if it is complete. Now, once again in the second premise we are searching for this something it is like to be in that mental state. And we are deciding whether we have this or not. And we say what we are searching for is second statement:

Individual A is the something it is like to be in that mental state.
This is a statement of ours, and additional clarification. Why is it so that individual A is itself the something? Because...

Individual A is something like.
Like what?
Like individual A in the state of direct knowledge of Individual A.
Y: Period.
B: Period.

## Don: (Acknowledges)

B: I believe it will be more simple.
Y: Yes, I agree.
1:19:44
B: And finally conclusion, now we have the mental state. We have the second ingredient which is:

Something that is it like to be in that mental state and is (?) A itself.
So we have both and we conclude:
Therefore Individual A is in a state of consciousness of itself.
Don: Thank you.
B: Thank you.
Y: I appreciate you going through it like that. You think very clearly; and you will be able to talk to that philosopher.
$B$ : Ah! Yes, yes, Alexander; he is great.
Y: And to your students. And there won't be any confusion which I have with my language difficulties because I learned to read upside down. That's almost like a... what do they call it, syllogism?

B: Yes, syllogism. Yes.
Y: Da, Da, and therefore.
B: This is why I wanted Don to find the Spinoza's definitions.
Y: Yes, I read some it the other day.
B: And Leibniz also; but Spinoza's is great.
Y: Well, the next section is a rewording of the above that some people have found useful like some of the people around here who have read it. Let's try it anyway.

A mental state is a consciousness state if to be in that state is like something.
Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is a conscious state if to be in that state of direct knowledge of itself is like Individual A itself. Because Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is like Individual A itself, Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is a state of consciousness of Individual A.

And I think that conclusion is wrong.
Individuals A's state of direct knowledge of itself is a state of...

No, it is right. I miss read it because what you are conscious of is A's state of direct knowledge of itself. It's not conscious of itself; it's conscious of the direct knowledge of itself.

B: The state of direct knowledge. Yes.
Y: Actually Darshana wrote that; and it's another way of thinking about it that is entirely different than mine which is this up here. But I think it is accurate. And if you find any difficulty with it, I would like to hear it.

B: Ok.
Don: Can I say something on this?
Y: Yeah, sure.
Don: Because it says, "The state of direct knowledge of itself is a state of consciousness," I have a hard time equating the two. It says... I am looking at the rewording of the last paragraph, the last phrase of that...lt says,
"Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is a state of consciousness."
Y: Well, you can't read it by itself. You have start with the because.
Don: I could say A's state of direct knowledge results in the state of consciousness of itself.

Y: Well, can you? Because Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is like Individual A itself.

Don: Yes, therefore Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself results in a state of consciousness of Individual A.

B: Yes.
Don: It's...the direct knowledge of itself is not...the state of direct knowledge is not a state of consciousness.

Darshana: It means you have to...
Y: Carry over the 'because.'
Darshana: Give up Chalmers definition because he didn't know about a state of knowledge.

Don: All right.
Darshana: He thinks a state, a state is a conscious state if it is like...
B: He says mental state.

Darshana: Our knowledge state is like ourselves. But that doesn't make our knowledge state a consciousness state according to our paradigm. It is according to his definition. So Don is right that Chalmers is not right about that. He is on the right track.

Y: And Chalmers admits that. He says, "This is as close as we have been able to get."

Don: (Acknowledges)
Y: And so I think results are probably right. What do you think?
Darshana: Well, if Chalmers were right, a state of knowledge is a state of consciousness because there is.

B: Something to be like.
Darshana: Something it is like. However, it is not a state of consciousness. It makes a state of consciousness. That likeness is the state of consciousness.

Y : It is the likeness that is the state of consciousness.
Don: That's why I would say, "Results in the state of consciousness." Does...Biljana do you...?

B: (Acknowledges) Yes, agree.
Darshana: Results sounds temporal; is that likeness?
Y : Is?
Darshana: which is the state of consciousness.
Don: I agree. You know, I agree with what you are saying Darshana. But...
Darshana: That's what is important anyway. You would have to reword the paragraph, I think.

Don: But...the problem here is they are equated. And people then start equating state of direct knowledge with state of consciousness...

Darshana: Yeah.
Don: ...which is a problem.
B: Maybe just a dash here...
Y: A what?
B: What is the (?) when we separate...to separate with a sign like this?

Y: Dash.
B: Dash.
Don: Hyphen.
B: Hyphen, yes.
Y: Between what and what?
B: Because Individual A's of direct knowledge of itself is like Individual itself: - (dash) Individual A's states of direct knowledge of itself is a state of direct knowledge of Individual A.

Y: Instead of a comma.
B: Yes, instead of a comma to separate it.
Y: So there's a possibility.
Darshana: It is still not right though. I can rewrite it easily, just let me do it. And then check it.

Y: You just fix the meal right now.
Darshana: All right.
Y: We'll take care of that later. But I heard you. So we have got the question there. I think it is a valid question.

B: A mental state is a conscious state if to be in that state is like something.
This is working hypothesis. And now we are searching for the ingredients. And the first statement is:

Individual state of direct knowledge of itself is a conscious state if to be in that state of direct knowledge of itself is like individual A itself.
So we actually reword the first statement by introducing state of direct knowledge instead of mental state. This is what we are doing with the second statement.

Y: Yes.
B: And now once we have this equivalence or we replace mental state with state of direct knowledge which is according to Lila, now we check whether we have both. And we say:

Because Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is like Individual itself; therefore...

Instead therefore just dash or even comma. Ok. Why not?

Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is a state of consciousness of Individual A.

No, it is not correct.
Don: Can I?
B: It is not correct that Individual state of direct knowledge of itself...of itself then of itself. Of itself should be stressed somehow, that it could be...

Y: Italicised?
B: Yes, because it could be understood that we equalize between state of direct knowledge and state of consciousness which is not. We equalize between state of direct knowledge and likeness of this state of direct knowledge with itself.

Y: Aha!
1:30:10
B: You know, because...so here...either this itself should be somehow stressed or even add the likeness once again. Because in order to have a state of consciousness, we need two ingredients: one is mental state which we replace with state of direct knowledge. So in order to have state of conscious of $A$, we need first direct knowledge...which is (?) mental state of Chalmers. This is one ingredient. But we also need the second ingredient which is something to be like, to be in state of direct knowledge. Something it is like to be in state of direct knowledge.

## Y: (Acknowledges)

B: Which is Chalmers, something that it is like to be in that mental state. So in order Individual A to be conscious of itself, this both should be fulfilled. And now we check.

Because Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is like Individual A itself,
So this is this something, Individual A state of direct knowledge and likeness. We should stress here not just Individual A's state of direct knowledge; but also the other ingredients which is to have something that it is like to be in that state of direct knowledge. And it is Individual A itself. Once we have both, then we have state of consciousness of Individual A.

Don: Yeah, if we just dropped Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself if we could just say...we could just say...

Y : Yes, it is too early for this is like Individual A itself.
Don: No. How about this, Biljana? If we just say:
Is like Individual A itself. A is in a state of consciousness of Individual A.

In other words...

B: Ah! Yes, maybe it is simpler.
Y: Yes.
B: It is simpler because this is additional clarification. It is not the basic definition.
Don: Just drop the direct knowledge of itself is.
B: Because this second draws someone to the conclusion that individual state of direct knowledge is a state of consciousness of Individual A which it is not although we have of itself. But it is not stressed the likeness.

Don: I bet if... yeah.
1:32:33
Darshana: The problem is Chalmers hadn't (?) got it quite right. So you can't have that be the basis.

Don: So, if it just reads:
Because Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is like Individual A itself, Individual A's state is one of consciousness of Individual A.

Y : Or Individual A is in a state.
Don: Yes. Of consciousness...

Individual A is in a state of consciousness of Individual A itself... of itself.

Just drop the direct knowledge.
B: Yes, yes, because, otherwise, it could be understood that we equalize between them.

Y: You see what we are doing? What we are introducing here is 'individual' into Chalmers' definition.
Don: (acknowledges)
B: But also so direct knowledge instead of mental state.
Y: Yes. Now read again what you have for me.
$B$ : From the beginning.
Y: Just from this point here because...
B: Because Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is like Individual A itself.
So we have the sameness.
Individual A is in state of consciousness of Individual A.

Here A itself should be added because it is as...we have just one ingredient which is something to be like.

Because individual A state of direct knowledge of itself is like Individual A itself.
So we have the one ingredient, which is to be like but where is the other which is individual A itself? So it shouldn't be...this second part defiantly shouldn't be...

Individual A state of direct knowledge
But rather, Aha! You know...or maybe change the...because here as it was previously meant, I believe, by Darshana, is that the individual's state of direct knowledge was put in the place of mental state. But these two ingredients, I call them, of Chalmers' definition are change in there. The sequence of them is changed and this is confusing. We should follow the sequence which is the sequence of basic premises.

Y: Well, then we are not rewording. We did that in the upper one, in this one.
B: Yes, we did that in one area.
$Y$ : But this is a rewording.
B: Ok, Ok, if... then Ok. It might be even Ok because just the sequence has changed.

Y: Yes.
B: We have first what is this something. And this something is:
State of direct knowledge of itself is like Individual A.
So we have the ingredients likeness and the second ingredient is the mental state itself which is now replaced by direct knowledge. Instead of mental state, we have state of direct knowledge. So just the sequence of these three ingredients is(has) changed.

Y: (Acknowledges)
B: And finally as a conclusion because this is so. This...A's state...this
A's state of direct knowledge is a state of consciousness of Individual A.
It could even stay. And Don if you want to repeat yours (?)
1:37:19
Don: I am looking at the second statement. In that rewording, it says:
Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is a conscious state.
Y: If...

B: Which is not correct actually. Aha! If we have is now, it couldn't be. We couldn't equalize because even if we say is. We couldn't equalize. We couldn't say:

Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is a conscious state.
Don: No, we could say:
Is coincident with the conscious state or results in.
B: Or results in.
Y: Is what?
B: Results in conscious state.
Y: Results.
B: Which is also not good; but to stress the point.
Darshana: No, no, because the point is, it's the state of sameness.
B: Yes, but you couldn't say
Individual state of direct knowledge of itself is a conscious state.
Y: Darshana, I just want to see what they come up with.
Darshana: Yeah Ok. But they don't understand that Chalmers doesn't matter.
Y: Yes, they do.
Darshana: If he's right, a state of knowledge is a state of consciousness. And that's not true.

B: Yes, but we don't stop with Chalmers. We start with Chalmers. We don't stop with him.

Darshana: Good.
B: We start with him.
Y: We agree all on that.
B: Yes, yes.
Y: Yes.
B: Otherwise, we should have finished.
Y: Yes. We could read his book, and say, "Go to that."

Darshana: That's a good idea.
Don: Yeah. (Not)
B: It may stay.
Y: How is it now that it makes sense? At what point? What is the last statement? Because...

B: Because Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is like Individual A itself...
So we have the likeness. And second we should have the mental state itself which is not replaced by direct knowledge. So the second is.

And Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself...
Don: We could just drop the second sentence completely. And the first and last would be sufficient.

Y: Mental state...but that doesn't tell them that...well, I see what you are driving at.
B: Yes, yes.
Don: The second sentence doesn't add anything new.
Y: Well, entirely possible. I haven't settled finally on anything yet. I am taking...I have a note of that, what you said.

Don: Ok.
B: Either we should not have these dots here with which we emphasize that we have new definitions.

Y: Ok let's cross off...
B: Then all could stay as additional explanation. Then it is Ok to have two explanations for one thing. We don't pretend. We don't have ambition this to be.

Y: Or we could say:
A mental state is a conscious state if to be in that state is like something
B: It's state...
$Y$ : that is.
B: Yes,
that is.
$\mathrm{Y}: \quad$ that is / the second statement.

B: And now this two could be under one statement with dot. And one will be additional explanation to the other.
$Y$ : The second one.
B: Yes. The second one could be additional explanation for the first or other way around. We shall decide. But they stay basically the same. So Don is right, if they could stay both. But one should be additional explanation to the second, not basic definition.

Y: I made that note.
B: As additional explanation, yes, they could stay. But as a basic definitions, no.
Y: Got it. And the last statement?
B: Because, this one?
Y: Because, yes.
B: Because Individual state of direct knowledge of itself is like Individual A itself (ingredient?) Individual A state of direct knowledge of itself.

It is not OK. No, not really.
Don: I didn't...
B: The third.

Because Individual A’s state of direct knowledge of itself is like Individual A itself.
We have likeness.
Don: Yes.
B: Now we should have the basic mental state which is now the basic direct...A's state of direct knowledge. But how to word it?

Because of Individual state of direct knowledge of itself is..
Y: But it is not...
B: Like Individual said...and Individual's state of direct knowledge of itself...
Don: What I just said after that... what I said was:
Because Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is like Individual A itself...
1:43:46
B: First I think we do (?)

Don: Individual A is in a state of consciousness of itself.
B: Yes.
Y: I think that better.
B: And then it would stay.
Don: So then just, well...
B: Yes, then the second sentence is additional explanation of the second. The third is additional explanation of the second.

Y: (Acknowledges)
Don: But the second can't...shouldn't say:
Direct knowledge is a conscious state.
B : No, it is conditional. It says,
Individual A's state of direct knowledge of itself is a conscious state. Only if It is now introducing a new picture.

If to be in that state of direct knowledge of itself is like individual A itself.
But should be stressed somehow.
Y: Only.
B: Only if...I don't say it is working hypothesis.
Individual states of direct knowledge of itself is conscious state.
No, it is never a conscious state.
Don: Yeah, that's my point.
Darshana: Well, your proving Chalmers is wrong which is Ok; but...
Don: I think Chalmers is irrelevant at this point.
Darshana: Then why do you...? You have to start over. Then the only purpose of that explaining who to apply Chalmers too.

B: You know, never...we should never state something which is not. And it not the case that conscious state is a state of direct knowledge. We have conscious state only if we have two ingredients: a state of direct knowledge which is Chalmers' mental state.

Y: And the likeness.
B: And something to be like in that state of direct knowledge.
Y: (Acknowledges)
B: Only then, we have consciousness. And never a state of direct knowledge is a conscious state, never.

Y: I agree.
Don: That's what I...
Darshana: So if you use...
Y: We won't worry about Chalmers.
Darshana: Then don't worry about all this...
B : Chalmers see into the picture. He is here.
1:46:42
Darshana: (?) the picture, you have got to take him out. Otherwise, if you use his ending, everyone will believe a state of knowledge is a state of consciousness because you apply Chalmers. And you say, "Now you have got a state of..."

Y: We will take care of that. All I have to do is just say, "Nagel and Chalmers attempted or started or came close to the definition." That's easy to take care of.

B: Yes.
Y : The important thing is that we state it correctly.
Darshana: Yeah, and what consciousness is.
$Y$ : That it is a state in which those conditions are fulfilled.
B: Right.
Y: Of likeness...
Darshana: Ok.
B: Of likeness some to be like.
Don: Something to be like. And I think that's done here with those two statements.
B: Once again have relation and relata; but this relata is one in the same.
Y: Yes.

B : This is it?
Y: That's right.
B: I have relata then relations, then relata. But this relata is one in the same. And I am just trying to put it into words.

Y: All right. What I want to do is take a break now. And maybe during the next three hours, we can all reflect on it a bit and write up some final statement. I had this insight of what consciousness was. And it took me three of four months to even write anything down about it. It was so difficult.

Don: (Acknowledges)
Y: And even you guys have got difficulties with it and you are experts in your field. It is because we are dealing with conscious in our own minds at the very time we are writing it down. And that's not easy because it keeps going like this and keeps vanishing.

B: It's Gödel; it Gödel's law.
Y: Yes. It is self-reference.
Don: Yeah.

Y: And so it is not easy.
B: And even if we apply to self-consciousness even more so
Y: Yes.
Don: The consciousness is incomplete.
Y: It's what?
Don: It's incomplete. It's a Gödel's theory of incompleteness. The consciousness is incomplete.
Y : Itself it is incomplete.
Don: Yeah.
Y: And that's what Chalmers' problem was. And that why he said he still has the hard problem of what is it. Well, this says what it is. It is a new state that has these conditions or...So we will take a break and come back and have another go at it. After we have had a chance to think about it ...over... have something to eat and a rest. And then l'll tell you some more things about the next paragraphs which are even worse.

Don: This is good fun.
Y: That is good brain storming. I like that.

Darshana: Would you stop by Namrata's on the way home?

